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I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer buys or leases goods or services from Seller and
signs a sales agreement. Consumer also signs a negotiable in-
strument,1 which Financer purchases from Seller, containing
'The Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in all fifty states
(Louisiania has adopted Articles 1, 3, 4, and 5), the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands, J. HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING
5 (4th ed. 1976), defines "negotiable instrument" as follows:
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Consumer's agreement to make installment payments for the
goods or services. Upon discovery that the goods or services are
of inferior quality, Consumer ceases payment. Financer then
sues Consumer in state court for nonpayment of the install-
ments. The court refuses to reach the merits of Consumer's de-
fense; instead it rules summarily in favor of Financer,2 who, by
virtue of possessing the negotiable instrument signed by Con-
sumer, sued in the capacity of a holder in due course, immune to
all but a few "real" defenses. 3 Consumer must pay Financer and
in some cases will not have even the consolation of recourse
against Seller, who may turn out to be judgment proof.
4
Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the
maker or drawer except as authorized by this Article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
U.C.C. § 3-104(1). Consumer's obligation to pay in installments is written in the form of
a negotiable instrument in a writing distinct from the agreement of sale. In line with
common practice, however, the two writings may be attached to one another by perfo-
ration. Both writings are signed separately by the Consumer. Thus, although the
agreement of sale contains other conditions and promises-for example, Seller's
warranties-the writing embodying Consumer's obligation, containing only an uncondi-
tional promise to pay, qualifies as a negotiable instrument.
2 In the case of goods, Consumer often will give Seller a security interest in the
goods. This security interest is sold with the note to Financer. Rohner, Holder in Due
Course in Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation?, 60 CORNELL L. REv.
503, 506-07 (1975). Financer often can attempt to repossess the goods, without suit,
upon Consumer's default. Nonetheless, preservation of Consumer's defenses is impor-
tant because Financer often will seek either a judgment on the debt before attempting
to foreclose the security interest or, having foreclosed the security interest and sold the
goods, judgment for any deficiency. See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Chapman,
129 Ga. App. 830, 201 S.E.2d 686 (1973). Thus, Consumer would still need the de-
fenses he could assert against his seller. Moreover, Consumer may wish to block
Financer's seizure of the goods securing the note by suing Financer. See, e.g., Fuller v.
American Aluminum Corp., 249 So. 2d 410 (Miss. 1971). In such a case, the defenses
Consumer could assert against Seller would be essential to any successful action against
Financer. For purposes of discussion, this Comment treats as the paradigm situation
one in which Financer sues Consumer on the underlying debt.
' According to the U.C.C., a holder in due course takes a negotiable instrument
free from all "personal defenses" such as failure or lack of consideration, breach of
warranty, unconscionability, or fraud in the inducement. For policy reasons, "real de-
fenses," such as infancy, duress, and fraud in the factum, are preserved and may be
raised by the maker against a holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-305(2); see J. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 486-89
(1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
'See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr.
976 (1971):
In the instant case, as in many situations in which consumers have been de-
frauded by a seller, a judgment against the seller alone would represent a Pyr-
rhic victory because the defrauding seller is insolvent and the victorious con-
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The foregoing scenario unfortunately is not an uncommon
one.5 The holder-in-due-course doctrine, which originally de-
veloped in the context of commercial paper markets, 6 has drawn
extensive criticism when applied to consumer transactions.7 State
courts and legislatures, sensitive to the consumers' plight, have
made diverse attempts to combat the inequity of the doctrine as
it applies to consumers, but have not achieved great success.
8
Predictions of its demise notwithstanding, 9 the holder-in-due-
course doctrine has proven to be a resilient concept that con-
tinues to pose a problem to consumers.' Still another consumer
champion may succeed, however, in dealing it the "coup de
grAce." The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has promulgated
a trade regulation rule1 designed to preserve a consumer's right
to assert against a financer who holds an otherwise negotiable
instrument any claims or defenses that the consumer might as-
sert against his seller-nondelivery, breach of warranty, or other
personal defense.' 2 The rule seeks to accomplish its purpose by
sumers remain liable to the finance companies, which as the assignees of the
installment contracts claim that they are entitled to payment even if the seller
acted fraudulently.
Id. at 821-22, 484 P.2d at 978, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 810. "Predatory" sellers may engage
either in business-on-a-shoestring or in fly-by-night operations, so that when consumers
wish to seek recourse against them, the businesses already may have failed or left town.
Similarly, if the seller was a short-lived corporation, the corporation may be defunct
when consumers seek relief against it.
5 See Speaker, Holder in Due Course-Burden of the Poor, 5 U.C.C. L.J. 146 (1972).
6 See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057
(1954); Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test,
39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48, 49 (1966).
See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 6; Littlefield, supra note 6; Rohner, supra note 2;
Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375 (1971).
8 See notes 28-44 infra & accompanying text.
9See Leary, Timely Demise of Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 5 U.C.C. L.J. 117, 119
(1972). See also Erickson, Demise of Holder in Due Course, Waiver of Defense, and Interlock-
ing Loan Lender Defenses in Consumer Transactions, 15 S. TEx. L.J. 236 (1974); Littlefield,
The Continuing Demise of the Holder in Due Course Concept, 79 CoM. L.J. 41 (1974).
10 Rohner, supra note 2, at 566-67.
11 Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1976). Upon
promulgation of the rule, the FTC issued a Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40
Fed. Reg. 53, 506-29 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FTC Statement], and later issued
Guidelines on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses, 41 Fed. Reg. 20,022-27 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Guidelines] and a
Statement of Enforcement Policy, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,594-97 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Enforcement Policy]. The voluminous collection of statements, articles, memoranda,
correspondence, and exhibits and the oral testimony from the 1971 and 1973 FTC
hearings on an earlier version of the rule are paginated consecutively within a single
FTC document. FTC Record and Transcript of Hearings on Proposed Trade Regulation Rule,
No. 215-31-1 (F.T.C., Jan. 26, 1971).
12 Under the rule, a consumer's recovery on a claim asserted against a financer is
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requiring sellers to include in agreements of sale a notice to
holders that a consumer's claims and defenses may be asserted
against them.1
3
When the notice required by the FTC rule is included in the
consumer credit contract the inequitable result of the introduc-
tory scenario will not obtain.' 4 This Comment explores the im-
pact of the rule on the adjudication of disputes arising between a
consumer and a financer in connection with consumer credit
contracts that, contrary to the direction of the rule, do not
include the notice to holders. 15 Part II will detail the problem
facing consumers and consider state judicial and legislative re-
sponses to it. Part III will examine the FTC rule in relation to
the general scheme for regulating deceptive trade practices
under the Federal Trade Commission Act (Act).' 6 Part IV will
weigh the arguments for and against the view that when the
required notice is not included, the FTC rule creates for the
consumer an implied federal right to assert claims and defenses
against the holder of this consumer credit contract. Part V con-
siders the effect that state courts might give to the rule as a
matter of state law even in the absence of an implied federal
right.
II. CONSUMER CAUGHT IN THE HOLDER'S GRASP
A. The Holder in Due Course Doctrine
A holder in due course is the possessor of a written, uncon-
ditional promise of payment-that is, a negotiable instrument 7
-taken for value, in good faith, and without notice that it is
overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or
claim to it on the part of any person.' 8 Such a holder is in the priv-
ileged position of holding the instrument free from all owner-
ship claims of third parties and being able to enforce its obliga-
limited to the amount paid under the credit instrument. FTC Statement, supra note 11,
at 53,524; Guidelines, supra note 11, at 20,023.
13 Alternatively, had a seller referred the consumer to a financer for a direct loan
to finance the sale, the seller would be required to refuse the loan proceeds unless the
notice to holders had been included in the loan agreement. FTC Statement, supra note
11, at 53,524-25; Guidelines, supra note 11, at 20,023-24.
14 See text accompanying notes 63-69 infra.
15 The major inspiration for this Comment is J. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 731-40.
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46, 47-58 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
17 U.C.C. § 3-104(1). This section of the Code is set forth at note I supra.
Is U.C.C. § 3-302(1).
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tion against nearly any defense. 19 The risk of loss thus is shifted
from the holder of the instrument to its maker. 2" The policy
justification for this allocation of risk is that it promotes the
availability of credit essential to healthy commerce. 21 Further-
more, because all merchants benefit from freely flowing com-
merce, having the makers of paper bear the risk of obtaining
credit is an equitable allocation of this risk, at least among mer-
chants. 22 When the maker is a consumer, however, significantly
different equitable considerations enter the picture. The con-
sumer transaction is centered around a particular purchase of
a good of service, which puts the typical consumer in a poor
position to insure against loss or spread its costs. 23 Nevertheless,
the same legal framework developed to meet the needs of com-
mercial paper markets has been imposed, to the detriment of
consumers, on transactions in consumer paper.24
In the introductory scenario, Financer enjoyed protected
status as a holder in due course of the negotiable note Consumer
had made out to Seller. Two other methods would have placed
Financer in a legally equivalent position. In many jurisdictions,
19 U.C.C. § 3-305. For examples of "real" defenses preserved against holders in due
course, see note 3 supra.
2" Rohner, supra note 1, at 505; see Gilmore, supra note 6; Rosenthal, supra note 7,
at 376.
21 The policy of promoting economic efficiency in commercial paper transactions,
therefore, favors placing the risk of loss on the maker of paper. See WHmTE & SUMMERS,
supra note 3, at 457; Rohner, supra note 2, at 528; Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 376-77.
2 See Littlefield, supra note 6, at 48.
21 As eloquently stated by Prof. Gilmore:
The privilege which commercial law confers upon the purchaser in good faith
or his alter ego, the holder in due course, is, always and everywhere, a com-
mercial privilege. It attaches to commercial property and to transactions be-
tween merchants. Consumer installment purchase is a commercial phenome-
non of considerable magnitude. But from the consumer's point of view the
transaction is not mercantile for the goods are no longer in commerce; they
have come to rest and become mere possessions. The inequality of bargaining
power and technological knowledge between consumer and dealer justifies the
conclusion .... that claims against the consumer will not, like ordinary com-
mercial claims, be allowed to pass free of defenses.
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 1101; see FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,522-24; Lit-
tlefield, supra note 6, at 48-49; Rohner, supra note 2, at 538-43; Rosenthal, supra note 7,
at 379-81. For the holder to bear the risk in consumer credit transactions is not only
more equitable, but also more efficient. See text accompanying notes 72-84 infra.
24 The law governing the good faith purchase of commercial paper had developed
fully before the advent of consumer paper onto the credit scene. Thus, when faced
with cases arising out of consumer credit-sale transactions, the courts naturally turned
to the existing body of law. Gilmore, supra note 6, at 1093-1102; Littlefield, supra note
6, at 60. For adjustments that the courts made in implicit recognition of the fundamen-
tally different nature of credit transactions involving noncommercial parties, see notes
28-38 infra & accompanying text.
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assignment to Financer of an agreement of sale incorporating a
waiver of defense clause would have provided immunity from
Consumer's claims and defenses. 25 There would have been a
similar result had Consumer been "referred" by Seller to Fi-
nancer to obtain a direct loan to finance the sale. Referral re-
lationships in these "interlocking loans" run the gamut from
simple referral to the situation in which Seller accompanies Con-
sumer to Financer's office and there accepts the proceeds of the
loan immediately after the papers are drawn up.26 Despite a
close "referral" relationship and the appearance to Consumer of
a unified transaction, the sale and the loan generally are consid-
ered to be discrete transactions, and Consumer's obligation to
Financer would be enforceable independently of his claims
against Seller.
27
B. State Judicial and Legislative Developments
The three methods by which financers are made secure
from consumers' claims and defenses-the negotiable consumer
note, the waiver of defense clause, and the interlocking loan
-have been subjected to varying degrees of regulation by state
courts and legislatures. As three aspects of the same problem,
they logically should be treated in a consistent fashion.
Although judicial protection extended in this area usually
has been for the benefit of the consumer, judicial response to the
different cut-off devices has been uneven. Although a few courts
have invalidated waiver of defense clauses either as unconscion-
able or as contrary to public policy 28 and one court has held
that retail installment contracts simply are not negotiable
instruments, 29 most courts have been reluctant to go so far.
Under the "close connectedness" doctrine, courts have denied
holder-in-due-course status to financer-assignees of consumer
paper when they were too closely connected with the seller-
25 FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,508 & 53,509-14; Rohner, supra note 2, at
507-08.
26 FTC Statement at 53,508 & 53,514-16; see Littlefield, Preserving Consumer De-
fenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272 (1969); Rohner,
supra note 2, at 508.
27 Interlocking loans are also sometimes called "vendor-related" loans. See FTC
Statement, supra note 11, at 53,508.
2 E.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969); see
Rehurek v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. App. 1972); Unico v. Owen, 50
N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Discount Purchasing Co. v. Porch, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
600 (Tenn. App. 1973).
29 Geiger Fin. Co. v. Graham, 123 Ga. App. 771, 182 S.E.2d 521 (1971).
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assignors.3 " Elements indicating close connection include draft-
ing by the financer of forms for the seller, the seller's assignment
of substantially all of his paper to the same financer, and com-
mon ownership or management of seller and financer. 3' Al-
though the legal rationale of the doctrine is unclear, it seems to
grow out of the notice and good faith requirements of holder-
in-due-course status.3 2 For purposes of "close connectedness,"
the seller may be characterized as the financer's agent, whose
notice of the consumer's defenses can be imputed to the
principal. 3 Sometimes the financer is said to lack the requisite
good faith because of close dealing with the seller.34 Another
possible rationale is that the "oneness" of the financer and seller
requires that both be subject to the consumer's defenses as a
matter of primary liability.3 5 Several state courts have made sig-
nificant retreats from earlier, liberal applications of the close
connectedness doctrine,36 which even in its most liberal strains
rather narrowly restricts the class of relationships that qualify as
"close connections. 37 In any case, judicial protection has never
gone so far as to include the informal referral relationships that
underlie interlocking loan transactions.
3 8
3"E.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d
819 (1950); Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Calvert
Credit Corp. v. Williams, 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. App. 1968); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63
So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); American
Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
3" WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 481.32 See id. 480.
11 See id.; Littlefield, supra note 6, at 67-68.
31 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 480; Littlefield, supra note 6, at 70-74.
11 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 480; Littlefield, supra note 6, at 68-70.36 See Rohner, supra note 2, at 517-21. Compare Sullivan v. United Dealers Corp.,
486 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1972) and Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228 (D.C.
App. 1972) (applying Maryland law), with Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W.2d
57 (Ky. 1969) and Kennard v. Reliance, Inc., 257 Md. 654, 264 A.2d 832 (1970). See also
Randolph Nat'l Bank v. Vail, 131 Vt. 390, 308 A.2d 588 (1973) (circumvention of stat-
ute limiting holder-in-due-course protection).3 7 See cases cited at notes 30-31 supra.
" See, e.g., Sullivan v. United Dealers Corp., 486 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1972). Illustrative
of the judicial leeway granted such referral relationships is the court's explanation of
upholding holder-in-due-course protection:
The evidence failed to demonstrate any direct connection between the contrac-
tor and the finance company except a frequent course of dealing between them. In
short, the evidence failed to demonstrate any bad faith on the part of the
finance company at the time of the negotiation and transfer of the note to it.
All of the evidence demonstrated a complete lack of notice to the finance com-
pany that would justify a finding that it failed to acquire the status of a holder
in due course.
Id. at 701-02 (emphasis supplied).
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Although legislatures are more competent than the courts to
deal with the problem in a systematic way, they nonetheless have
failed to do so. 3 9 The lack of uniformity of statutory regulation
among jurisdictions is startling, and the three defense cut-off
mechanisms are not equally regulated even within a given juris-
diction. As of 1972, thirty-four jurisdictions limited to some de-
gree the use of negotiable consumer notes, thirty-seven had dealt
in some fashion with waiver of defense clauses, but only six had
addressed interlocking loans. ° Only twenty jurisdictions had ef-
fectively banned defense cut-offs through the use of negotiable
consumer paper, and only sixteen had banned waiver of defense
clauses entirely.41 The other jurisdictions that regulated these
two mechanisms limited their prohibition of defense cut-offs to
specific transactions or to specific time periods, after which the
holder becomes a holder in due course if notice of claims or
defenses has not been received from the consumer.42 In this
uneven scheme of legislation, the most egregious omission is the
general failure to regulate interlocking loans.43
Assessing these efforts of state courts and legislatures one
commentator has said:
Holder in due course is not dead, even in its historical
sense, so long as different jurisdictions treat it differ-
ently in their courts and legislatures and so long as
it is not abolished root and branch in all consumer
transactions-from home improvements to auto sales
.... In fact, to prolong the metaphor, holder in due
course is not a single organism slayable in a single blow.
It is a collection of legal traditions and rules and com-
mercial practices which merge into a single result: the
insulation of financers from consumer claims. No as-
39 Regarding a recent federal statute limiting the application of the holder-in-due-
course doctrine in credit card transactions, Depository Institutions Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. III, § 170, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1691 (Supp. IV 1974), see Rohner, supra note 2, at 504 & n.l1, 508-09, 521,
526-27. See generally Littlefield, Preservation of Consumer Defenses in Interlocking Loans and
Credit Card Transactions-Recent Statutes, Policies, and a Proposal, 1973 WXis. L. REV. 471.
The ramifications of the holder-in-due-course doctrine in credit card transactions will
not be explored in this Comment.4" See Crandall, Tie Wisconsin Consumer Act: Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws Before and
After, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 334 apps. 4 & 5, at 386-94.
41 Id.
42 Willier, Need for Preservation of Buyers' Defenses-State Statutes Reviewed, 5 U.C.C.
L.J. 132 (1972). For an update of the 1972 compilation of statutes, see Rohner, supra
note 2, at 522 n.90.
43 See Littlefield, supra note 26, at 286-97.
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sault on the doctrine can therefore succeed unless it is
both comprehensive and uniform, and the impetus for
such an attack may need to come from the federal
level.44
The FTC rule is just such a federal initiative. This Com-
ment will proceed to sketch the backdrop of the rule-the Act's
scheme for regulating deceptive trade practices-and then ex-
amine its specific provisions.
III. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE AND AGENCY DEVELOPMENTS
A. FTC Regulation of Deceptive Trade Practices-
The Overall Enforcement Scheme
Section 5(a)(1) of the Act 45 declares "[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce" to be unlawful. As
originally enacted in 1914, the prohibition applied only to "un-
fair methods of competition. '46 The language prohibiting decep-
tive trade practices was added by the Wheeler-Lea Amendments
of 193841 in order to overrule a Supreme Court decision confin-
ing the reach of section 5 to acts having an adverse competitive
impact.48 The addition evidenced a clear intention to make con-
sumer protection a primary purpose of the Act: "[T]his amend-
ment makes the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair
trade practice, of equal concern, before the law, with the mer-
chant or manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dis-
honest competitor.
'49
Section 5(b) authorizes the FTC to initiate cease and desist
proceedings against violators of section 5(a)(1) if, in the agency's
view, such prosecution is in the public interest.50 Until recently,
aside from seeking voluntary compliance, the FTC was limited to
cease and desist proceedings in fulfilling the enforcement role
44 Rohner, supra note 2, at 566-67.
41 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
46 38 Stat. 719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975)).
47 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975)).
48 FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
49 H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). See Lovett, Private Actions for
Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 AD. L. REv. 271, 274 (1971); Note, Implied Civil Remedies for
Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 54 B.U. L. REV. 758, 762 (1974);
Comment, Consumer Protection: Proposed Federal Trade Commission Rule-Preservation of
Buyers' Claims and Defenses in Consumer Installment Sales, 21 J. PUB. L. 169 (1972). But see
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Many states were in-
spired to enact "Little FTC Acts." See Lovett, supra, at 275, 281-90.
5" 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. V 1975).
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assigned it. The FTC's record in enforcing the section 5 pro-
scription of deceptive trade practices was poor.51 This ineffec-
tiveness has been traced to lack of planning, misallocation of
scarce resources, delay, excessive reliance on voluntary com-
pliance, and lack of meaningful sanctions.
52
Criticism of the FTC's performance provided part of the
impetus for the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act of 1975 (1975 Act),5 3 which endowed the
agency with improved weapons to combat consumer fraud.
5 4
The 1975 Act authorized the FTC to promulgate trade regula-
tion rules "which define with specificity acts or practices which
are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce"5 and empowered it to enforce these rules by civil ac-
tions in which consumer redress is to be available. 56 The 1975
51 See, e.g., Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586-88 (N.D. Ind. 1976);
REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969)
[hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT]; E. Cox, R. FELLMETH, & J. SCHULTZ, 'THE NADER
REPORT' ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); Note, supra note 49, at 763-65;
Comment, supra note 49, at 169-73.
52 ABA REPORT, supra note 51, at 34-35, 54-55, 62-63; see Note, supra note 49, at
763-74.
53 Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
54 Id. tit. II. Title I of the 1975 Act dealt with federal warranty standards, see note
168 infra. In 1973, the Act was amended to empower the FTC to obtain a preliminary
injunction from a district court against alleged violations of the Act. Act of Nov. 16,
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(f), 87 Stat. 576 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. V
1975)).
55 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975). Rules promulgated under this sub-
paragraph "may include requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing such
[unfair or deceptive] acts or practices." Id. Banks are excluded from the FTC's jurisdic-
tion. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970). The 1975 Act requires, however, that within 60 days
after the effective date of a deceptive trade practice rule promulgated by the FTC, the
Federal Reserve Board "shall promulgate substantially similar regulations" prohibiting
"substantially similar" acts or practices by banks unless the Board finds that "(A) such
acts or practices of banks are not unfair or deceptive, or (B) that implementation of
similar regulations with respect to banks would seriously conflict with essential mone-
tary and payments systems policies of the Board .... " 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(1) (Supp. V
1975). The Board has not promulgated a "substantially similar" regulation to the FTC
preservation of claims and defenses rule because in its current version the rule is not
enforceable against creditors. Text accompanying note 62 infra. The proposed amend-
ment to the rule, however, is enforceable against creditors. Text accompanying notes
94-95 infra. Aware that a substantially similar regulation applicable to banks thus may
become necessary if the FTC promulgates its proposed revision, the Board has pub-
lished notice to the banking community seeking reactions and input. 41 Fed. Reg.
7,110-11 (1976).
56 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975). The nature of relief available in an FTC civil
action includes
such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers or other
persons, partnerships, and corporations resulting from the rule violation or the
unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the ease may be. Such relief may include,
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Act did not, however, create an explicit private right of action
against deceptive trade practices.
57
Improvements notwithstanding, criticism continues to be
leveled that sole reliance on the FTC is inadequate to assure
proper regulation of deceptive trade practices.5 8 There is room
but shall not be limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of
money or return of property, the payment of damages, and public notification
respecting the rule violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the
case may be; except that nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize the
imposition of any exemplary, or punitive damages.
Id. Other important provisions of the 1975 Act include expanding the FTC's jurisdic-
tion to include trade practices "in or affecting commerce," 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V
1975), and authorizing the agency to seek civil penalties for knowing violations of its
rules and cease and desist orders respecting unfair or deceptive trade practices, 15
U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. V 1975). For basic source material on the 1975 Act, see [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7702-75; Kintner & Smith, The Emergence of the Federal
Trade Commission as a Formidable Consumer Protection Agency, 26 MERCER L. REv. 651
(1975); Note, The Magnuson-Moss Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act: Im-
provements or Broken Promises?, 61 IowA L. REv. 222 (1975).
51 A private right of enforcement was recommended in ABA REPORT, supra note
51, at 63-64. Predecessors to the bill that ultimately was enacted in 1975 did contain
provisions creating such a right, but they died in committee or were never brought to a
vote on the floor before the end of the respective Congresses in which they were intro-
duced. E.g., S. 1823, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REc. 14298 (1971) (referred to the
Committee on Commerce where it died, never being reported out before the end of the
92d Congress); S. 3201, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 36598-600 (1969) (re-
ported out of Committee on Commerce with amendments, S. REP. No. 1124, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), and referred to Committee on the Judiciary, 116 CONG. REC.
29006 (1970), reported out of the Committee on the Judiciary without recommenda-
tion, 116 CONG. REc. 34898 (1970) (the original version provided for private action only
after the FTC had issued a cease and desist order; the amendments of the Committee
on Commerce provided, in addition, for consumer class actions against deceptive trade
practices with no requirement of prior FTC action; the bill was never brought to a floor
vote in the Senate before the end of the 91st Congress)); S. 3092, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.,
115 CONG. REC. 32141-42 (1969) (provided for consumer class actions; referred to
Committee on Commerce and never reported out before the end of the 91st Congress);
H.R. 14931, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 35275 (1969) (provided for both
private and class actions; died in the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce);
H.R. 14832, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 34374 (1969) (same). Lovett, supra
note 49, at 279-80, explains that these proposals for private remedies were the victims
of crossfire between consumer protection enthusiasts and business interests opposing
even the more conservative provision for private action subsequent to an FTC cease
and desist order. See also Note, supra note 49, at 759 & n.7.
58 Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976):
The ineffectiveness of the Federal Trade Commission was argued in the Hollo-
wa case. . . . While complaints of this nature have become more frequent,
Congress has not seen fit to alter the basic statutory plan as it was amended in
1938. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act . . . expanded consumer remedies but does not alter the Federal
Trade Commission Act as it relates to suits of this type.
Id. at 587 (citations omitted). See ABA REPORT, supra note 51, at 114-18 (in his state-
ment, R. Posner expressed strong doubts whether the proposed improvements would
indeed improve the FTC's performance in the consumer protection area); Note, supra
note 56, at 223 n.8, 258-59.
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for doubting whether substantial relief will be forthcoming to
consumers as a consequence of the new provision permitting
consumer redress litigation.
59
B. Rule Currently in Effect
The specific language of the FTC rule in effect since May
14, 1976, is as follows:
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or
services to consumers, in or affecting commerce as
"commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice
within the meaning of Section 5 of that Act for a seller,
directly or indirectly, to:
(a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract
which fails to contain the following provision in at least
ten point, bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBT-
OR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR
SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PRO-
CEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR
SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER.
or, (b) Accept, as full or partial payment for such sale
or lease, the proceeds of any purchase money loan (as
purchase money loan is defined herein), unless any con-
sumer credit contract made in connection with such
purchase money loan contains the following provision
in at least ten point, bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT
IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR
59 See Maher, Two Little Words and FTC Goes Local, 80 DIcK. L. REV. 193 (1976):
Honesty compels admitting a certain skepticism about consumer redress litiga-
tion beyond meaningful consumer control. Those provisions have all the ear-
marks of becoming little more than a tool with which to coerce early submis-
sion of respondents. If this proves correct, their actual use will be infrequent
and must prove an irritant to professional consumerists who inevitably will
decry underutilization.
Id. 197.
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SERVICES OBTAINED WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RE-
COVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED
AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
6 0
The avowed purpose of the rule is to make it an unfair and
deceptive practice within the meaning of section 5 of the Act for
a seller to exploit negotiable consumer notes, waiver of defense
clauses, or interlocking loans in order to separate the consumer's
duty to pay from the seller's duty to fulfill his obligations.
61
Significantly, the rule seeks to solve the problem of these con-
sumer defense cut-offs by creating a duty in sellers alone, rather
than subjecting both sellers and financers to its strictures. 62 The
rule adopts this strategy even though defense cut-offs result
from the assertion by financers-not sellers-of holder-in-due-
course status vis-h-vis consumers.
The weapon the rule wields against the holder in due course
is the required notice. The holder of a consumer credit contract
containing it would fail to qualify as a holder in due course as a
matter of state law either because its inclusion renders the prom-
ise of payment conditional or because, advised by it, the holder
would not be without notice and in good faith.6 3 Once the notice
is included in the credit contract, preservation of claims and
defenses against the holder is an inevitable result of the opera-
tion of state law-the state courts must, after all, give effect to
the contract as written.
64
The two parts of the rule address themselves to consumer
defenses cut-offs by (a) negotiable instruments or waiver of de-
fense clauses and (b) interlocking loans, respectively. Part (a)
requires that all consumer credit contracts to which a seller is a
party contain the notice. Credit instruments incorporating the
notice would be nonnegotiable. 65 Negotiability could not be res-
urrected through a waiver of defense clause because the credit
contract then would no longer "contain" the notice. 66 Part (b)
permits a seller to accept the proceeds of an interlocking ("pur-
chase money") loan only if the financer ("creditor") has in-
60 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1976). Relevant definitions are given at 16 C.F.R. § 433.1
(1976). See generally note 11 supra.
61 FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,522-26; Guidelines, supra note 11, at 20,023.
62 The proposed amendment to the rule includes creditors (such as Financer in the
introductory scenario) within its scope. Test accompanying notes 94-95 infra.
63 See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra; Enforcement Policy, supra note 11, at
34,595; Guidelines, supra note 11, at 20,023-24.64J. HONNOLD, supra note 1, at 737.
65 Text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
66 Guidelines, supra note 11, at 20,023; see FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,524.
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cluded the notice 67 in the consumer credit contract from which
the loan issued. The definition of purchase money loan makes
clear that connection between a seller and financer sufficient to
trigger the operation of part (b) will be inferred from affiliation
by common control, contract, or business arrangement or from a
referral relationship. 68 In making a continuing but informal re-
ferral relationship a sufficient basis for denying holder-in-due-
course status, the FTC rule goes well beyond even the most
liberal constructions of "close connectedness" at state law.
69
Nonetheless, merely providing information on sources of credit,
or even suggesting to customers on a regular basis that credit
might be available from a particular financer, does not constitute
referral within the meaning of the rule; a referral relationship,
however informal, must be characterized by the seller and
financer's concerted or cooperative conduct that channels the
consumer to the given source of credit.70 Where there is no
mutually beneficial relationship with the financer, the rule would
allow a seller to accept the proceeds of a loan issuing from a
credit contract that omits the notice to holders.
71
The traditional justification of the holder-in-due-course doc-
trine is its efficient and equitable allocation of risk in commercial
paper markets.72 In the interest of efficiency, the risk of loss
should be placed on the party best able to prevent or distribute
that risk. 73 The holder-in-due-course doctrine places the risk
that the seller will fail to perform contractual obligations
squarely on the shoulders of the consumer in order to assure a
continuing flow of credit from financers who, in theory, would
67The notice required by part (b) omits three words-PURSUANT HERETO
OR-contained in the part (a) notice. The FTC states, however, that both notices have
exactly the same legal effect: the creditor stands in the shoes of the seller. Guidelines,
supra note 11, at 20,023. The text, therefore, does not distinguish between the two
notices and refers to either by the same expression: "required notice" or "notice to
holders."
68 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d) (1976). For the FTC's construction of "affiliation" and "re-
ferral," see Enforcement Policy, supra note 11, at 34,595-96; Guidelines, supra note 11,
at 20,025-26.69 See note 38 supra & accompanying text.
7" See Enforcement Policy, supra note 11, at 34,596.
71 Id.; Guidelines, supra note 11, at 20,025. Without more, an ongoing procedure
whereby a seller assists a financer in perfecting security interests in goods that are
bought from the seller with the proceeds of direct loans from the financer does not
constitute a "business arrangement" or other form of creditor affiliation within the
meaning of the rule. National Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,155
(June 18, 1976) (FTC advisory opinion).
72 See notes 21-22 supra & accompanying text.
73 See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS (1970).
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close their fists if they were compelled to bear this risk.74 In
promulgating its rule, however, the FTC determined that be-
cause of the markedly different nature of consumer credit trans-
actions both efficiency and equity would be served best by elimi-
nation of negotiability in the consumer context; 75 that is, the
financer, not the consumer, is best able to bear the risk of loss.
76
Indeed, an examination of the risk allocation achieved by the
holder-in-due-course doctrine in the consumer context suggests
that the doctrine hinders the efficiency it is designed to
promote. 77 The consumer usually lacks the information and
economic muscle to police seller misconduct and spread the
costs. 7 8 In contrast, the FTC explains:
The creditor financing the transaction is in a better po-
sition [to reallocate the costs of seller misconduct] than
the consumer because (1) he engages in many trans-
actions where consumers deal infrequently; (2) he has
access to a variety of information systems which are un-
available to consumers; (3) he has recourse to contrac-
tual devices which render the routine return of seller
misconduct costs to sellers relatively cheap and automa-
tic; and (4) the creditor possesses the means to initiate a
lawsuit and prosecute it to judgment where recourse to
the legal system is necessary.
79
Further, whereas a consumer cut off from his or her defenses
must bear the full cost of the seller's misconduct, 0 financers
have the ability to "pass back" these costs to sellers by means of
repurchase provisions or to "pass on" and "spread out" these
costs among consumers generally by increasing the cost of
credit.8 ' Finally, financers can cease making credit available to
high risk sellers-a result that, on balance, should benefit con-
sumers by keeping predatory sellers out of the market.82 Experi-
74 See notes 20-22 supra & accompanying text.
1- FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,522-24.7'6 See id.
77 See generally Rohner, supra note 2, at 527-5 1.
78 FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,523. Significantly, the FTC found consumer
credit sales to involve an adhesive bargaining process in which consumers are compelled
to surrender their right to assert claims and defenses: "[p]romissory notes and waivers
of defenses are presented to consumers on a take it or leave it basis." Id. at 53,523-24.
19 Id. at 53,523; see Rohner, supra note 2, 538-43.
8" The sums in question can be substantial-the litigation involves high-cost items
such as cars, home improvements, and furniture. See Speaker, supra note 5, at 147-48.
81 FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,518-20.
82 Id. 53,520-22. See also Rohner, supra note 2, at 543. Although this would mean
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ence under state statutes eliminating negotiability in consumer
contracts suggests that preservation of consumer defenses will
not have a significant impact on either availability of credit or
interest rates.83 In addition to these considerations, the FTC
found that equity commanded, the same policy: "It is unfair to
subject an innocent party to costs and harm occasioned by a
guilty party.
84
Notwithstanding the 1975 changes, the Act's explicit en-
forcement scheme still may be inadequate to achieve the policy
objectives of the rule. Given only limited resources85 to allocate
among its various functions, the FTC presumably will have to
rely heavily on voluntary compliance by sellers. The efforts that
are undertaken to enforce compliance will be significantly re-
stricted because the enforcement sanction of the present rule
reaches only sellers. 86 If a credit contract omits the required
notice, the FTC will not be able to prosecute 87 the financer who
sues the consumer while claiming the holder-in-due-course
privilege.88
As a practical matter, the FTC generally will be able to dis-
cipline only large retailers and dealers who do not include the
notice to holders in their installment sales agreements. Under its
new authority, the FTC can bring these sellers into court and
have the contracts reformed to include the notice. 89 Further-
more, if financer-assignees of these contracts have collected from
consumers wrongly cut off from their defenses, then the FTC
will be able to collect damages from the merchants on the con-
that consumers no longer would be able to obtain credit from high risk sellers squeezed
out of the market, this may be a price well worth paying. FTC Statement, supra note 11,
at 53,520.
83 FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,520-21.
84 Id. 53,523. Another equity consideration in consumers' favor was mentioned ear-
lier. Negotiability in consumer transactions is unfair, because consumers simply do not
view the two aspects of credit sales-the sales aspect and the credit aspect-as being
separate and independently enforceable. See note 23 supra & accompanying text.
85 The 1975 Act set ceilings on appropriations to the FTC: $42 million for fiscal
year 1974-75, $46 million for 1975-76, and $50 million for 1976-77. 15 U.S.C. § 57c
(Supp. V 1975); see Note, supra note 56, at 258 & n.313. But cf. White, F.T.C.: Wrong
Agency for the Job of Adjudication, 61 A.B.A.J. 1242, 1242-43 (1975) (noting the possibility
of a supplemental appropriation to the FTC to support its antitrust program).
86 Text accompanying note 62 supra.
87 In addition to its cease and desist power, the FTC now has authority to seek
preliminary injunctions or initiate civil actions against alleged violators of its regulations.
See notes 50, 54, 56 supra & accompanying text.
88 For a discussion" of whether state courts will accord a financer the holder-in-
due-course privilege even in the absence of an implied federal right of consumers to
assert claims and defenses, see notes 214-24 infra & accompanying text.
89 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975); see note 56 supra & accompanying text.
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sumers' behalf.9°1 Given its budget constraint, however, the FTC
likely will limit such consumer redress litigation to cases involv-
ing large offenders; 91 those smaller offenders that the FTC does
pursue may turn out to be judgment proof.92 Perhaps most im-
portantly, under the present scheme, if the credit contract omits
the notice, the consumer will not be relieved of the immediate
burden of having to pay the third-party financer. The damages,
if any, that the FTC recoups on the consumer's behalf will be
paid only after a delay. The obligation to make initial payment,
coupled with possibly a substantial delay before receipt of com-
pensation, clearly will impose hardship upon the consumer,
especially a poor one. 93 Thus, inherent delays and selective FTC
prosecution under the Act may fail to effectuate adequately the
rule's policy of preserving consumer claims and defenses.
C. Proposed Amendment to the Rule
At the same time the FTC promulgated the current rule, it
issued a proposal for its revision:
In connection with any Purchase Money Loan (as
that term is defined in § 433.1) or any sale or lease of
goods or services, in or affecting commerce as "com-
merce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission
Act, it constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice
within the meaning of Section 5 of that Act, for a seller
9" See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975); note 56 supra & accompanying text.
91 In recommending a provision allowing consumer class actions as a supplement to
FTC civil actions, the Senate Committee on Commerce recognized the practical impact
of agency financial limitations in its report on a predecessor of the 1975 Act, S. 3201,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969):
2. The authority granted by this bill to the FTC . . . to obtain redress on
behalf of the consumer remains ancillary to [its] primary function-elimination
of unfair and deceptive acts and practices. The FTC . . .- the [staff] and
[budget] of which will inevitably remain limited-must therefore choose from
among the hundreds of thousands of potential consumer actions only those
limited number of cases which [its] systems of priorities identify as germane to
this objective. For example, the FTC might find that a particular case involving
notorious fraud, but affecting only several thousand residents of a smaller city
should be rejected in favor of an action against the national advertiser whose
product claims are on the borderline of deception and hence require the
Commission's expert delineation. The necessity to allocate legal resources will
necessarily leave unsatisfied hundreds, if not thousands, of valid cases in which
consumers have suffered significant damages but which the government might
choose not to prosecute.
S. RE. No. 1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1970). See generally note 57 supra.
92 See note 4 supra.
93 For a succinct analysis of the special inequity visited upon the poor by the holder
in due course, see Speaker, supra note 5.
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or a creditor, directly or indirectly, to take or receive a
consumer credit contract which fails to contain the fol-
lowing provision in at least ten point, boldface type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUB-
JECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SER-
VICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PRO-
CEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR
SHALL BE LIMITED TO AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER.
9 4
The proposed amendment would subject financers, as well as
sellers, to enforcement sanctions:
While the proceedings on 16 CFR 433 were primar-
ily concerned with the commercial conduct of sellers,
the record contains detailed information about related
commercial practices of creditors which causes the
Commission to have reason to believe that many cred-
itors are participants in the aforesaid practice [cut-off of
consumer defenses], that it is unfair and deceptive for
them to engage in the practice and that the pro-
scriptions of the rule can more effectively be enforced if
creditors are subject to its provisions. Therefore, in the
interest of (1) encompassing within the rule all partici-
pants in the aforesaid practice whose participation is
unfair or deceptive and (2) facilitating enforcement of
the rule, the Commission hereby proposes the aforesaid
amendment. 95
Notably, under the revision, a seller would not commit an
unfair trade practice by accepting the proceeds of an interlock-
ing loan issuing from a consumer credit contract that omits the
required notice; part (b) of the current rule is dropped. Because
the proposed revision explicitly makes the regulation directly
enforceable against a financer who omits the notice in the first
place, the need for part (b) is eliminated. Instead of attempting
to reach financers through the many sellers with whom they
deal, the FTC would be able to confront the financers them-
selves.
94 FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,530. The phrase "be limited to" in the notice
was changed to read "not exceed" at 41 Fed. Reg. 4,833 (1976).
95 FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,530.
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On the other hand, the amendment's language stating that
"it constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice... for... a
creditor, directly or indirectly, to take or receive a consumer
credit contract [omitting the required notice] ' 96 is broad enough
to permit the construction that a financer commits an unfair
trade practice by accepting the assignment of a purportedly
negotiable consumer note or of an installment sales agreement
incorporating a waiver of defense clause. In such situations the
FTC can choose to pursue either the seller who omitted the
notice or the financer-assignee. Because it is always the financer
who enjoys holder-in-due-course status and can preclude the
consumer from asserting claims and defenses, the policy goals of
the rule will be more efficiently served by permitting the FTC to
sue the financer. The change should be of particular value in
promoting the goal of consumer compensation, because, in a
suit to recoup payments made by consumers, the FTC is much
less likely to find the financer to be judgment proof than it is so
to find the seller.
9 7
Although the proposed amendment thus will significantly
improve the FTC's ability to realize its policy objectives, exclusive
enforcement by the agency will be subject to inadequacies similar
to those already identified under the current rule.98 Scarce re-
sources will continue to limit FTC enforcement proceedings to
the larger offenders, necessitating great reliance on voluntary
compliance. Although the FTC will be able to sue successfully
major financers to reform their consumer loan forms to include
the required notice and to recoup consumer payments, smaller-
sized violators may escape agency sanctions. Importantly, where
a credit contract wrongly omits the notice, consumers still will be
required to meet their obligation to pay the financer in spite of
their defenses; again, given exclusive FTC enforcement, the con-
sumer will be forced to wait on FTC litigation for recoupment
that by long delays will cause significant hardship for the poor
consumer.
D. Consumer Relieffor Noninclusion of the
Required Notice
Both the current rule and its proposed revision are silent
regarding consumers' rights to raise claims and defenses when a
96 Id.
" See note 4 supra & accompanying text.9S Text accompanying notes 85-93 supra.
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consumer credit contract omits the required notice. 9 9 When the
notice is included, the right to raise defenses is dictated by state
law.' 0 0 The argument might be made, therefore, that when the
notice is omitted, although in contravention of the FTC regula-
tion, consumers' rights also should be governed by state law.
According to this argument, the only explicit federal remedy
available to the consumer would be a civil action brought by
the FTC.
Although certain FTC statements might seem to suggest
that the rule is designed to operate through the exclusive me-
dium of state law, 1 1" close reading indicates that such an infer-
ence would be mistaken. Making clear that state law governs any
adjudication of a credit contract in which the required notice has
been included, the FTC nevertheless is silent on the issue of
which law-state or federal-governs when the notice is omitted;
it would be consistent with the rule's purpose of preserving con-
sumers' claims and defenses to maintain that whereas the exis-
tence and success of such claims and defenses is a matter of state
law, the right to raise them in the first place is a federal right.
Complete reliance on FTC civil actions, under the circumstances
described in the opening scenario, would provide only an inade-
quate remedy. Consumers will want the state courts to recognize
and rule on the merits of their defenses in order to avoid the
immediate burden of having to pay the financer. The prospect
of compensation from a judgment obtained by the FTC some-
time in the future-an uncertain prospect in any case-is not
much of a consolation in the present." 2 This Comment, there-
fore, next will inquire whether, in addition to the explicit right
of enforcement delegated by the Act to the FTC, the courts
should recognize an implied consumer right to enforce the
policies of the rule.
99 One state requiring notice to holders of consumer notes deals explicitly with this
issue in statutory language providing that even if notice is omitted and the holder of a
note is unaware that it is a consumer note, the holder is nonetheless subject to all claims
and defenses arising out of the transaction. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.541(b) (Supp. 1976).
A few other state statutes banning negotiable instruments from consumer credit sales
specifically impose liability on the holder of an instrument issued in violation of the ban,
even if the holder is otherwise a holder in due course. IDAHO CODE §§ 28-32-403,
28-32-404(b) (Supp. 1976); WIs. STAT. § 422.406(3) (1971).
190 See notes 63-64 supra & accompanying text.
1 1 Enforcement Policy, supra note 11, at 34,595; Guidelines, supra note 11, at
20,023-24.
12 See note 93 supra & accompanying text.
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:876
IV. IMPLICATION OF A FEDERAL RIGHT TO RAISE
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
A. The Implication Doctrine
1 3
A long line of Supreme Court decisions clearly have estab-
lished that federal constitutional provisions and criminal or reg-
ulatory statutes may create implied private rights of action.
1
0
4
The doctrine of implication that has grown out of these cases is
founded upon the notion that although it is within the particular
competence of legislatures to define rights, the courts are par-
ticularly competent to fashion remedies that adequately will vin-
dicate those rights?05 The courts give considerable deference to
the method of enforcement explicitly provided for by a statute,
and they will not disturb a clear legislative intent that such means
be exclusive. In the absence of clear legislative intent to exclude
a private right of action, however, the courts may imply one
when necessary to effectuate a statutory policy and when an
implied private remedy will not impair significantly either the
explicit statutory scheme of enforcement or some other statutory
policy.' °6 If a federal statute is at issue, courts are also sensitive
to federalism concerns and require that implication of a private
federal remedy not invade unnecessarily an area more appro-
priately regulated by state law.0 7
In Cort v. Ash, 108 the most recent Supreme Court decision
10 This Comment does not present a comprehensive analysis of the implication
doctrine. For thorough background on the doctrine, see sources cited at note 104 infra.
104 E.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (shareholders do not have implied right to
enforce statutory ban on political campaign contributions by corporations); National
R.R. Pass'r Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass'rs, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (rail passengers
do not have implied right to enforce the Rail Passenger Act of 1970); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (citizens have an implied right to
enforce the fourth amendment); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (share-
holders have an implied right to enforce the Securities and Exchange Commission's
proxy rules); T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (a shipper of goods by
motor carrier does not have an implied right to enforce the Motor Carrier Act); Texas
& Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (railroad employee has an implied right to
enforce the Federal Safety Appliance Acts). See McMahon & Rodos, Judicial Implication
of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 DICK. L. REv. 167 (1976);
Note, supra note 49; Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963); Comment, Emerging Standards for Implied Actions Under Federal
Statutes, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 294 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Emerging Standards];
Comment, Private Rights of Action under Amtrak and ASH: Some Implications for Implication,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Implications].
"I See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964). See generally
secondary sources cited at note 104 supra.
' See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
10 7 Id.
08 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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involving the implication doctrine, the Court articulated the test
for implying private rights of action under federal statutes:
In determining whether a private remedy is im-
plicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several
factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,"
that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legisla-
tive intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a
remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?' 9
This Comment will now proceed to apply the Cort test to the
issue of private enforcement of the FTC rule. It will argue that,
according to the factors identified in Cort, a private right of
action should be implied under the FTC rule.
B. Implied Private Remedy Under Section 5 of the
FTC Act: The Precedents
Any argument that the FTC rule promulgated pursuant to
section 5 of the Act impliedly creates a private right of action
must first take account of Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.""x In
Holloway, the District of Columbia Circuit Court held that there
is no implied private right of action under section 5 because
Congress intended the administrative program of enforcement
explicitly provided by the Act to be exclusive and because a pri-
vate remedy would conflict with the legislative scheme."1 The
109 Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
"- 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Holloway was a consumer class action, with plain-
tiffs alleging as one ground of recovery that defendant Bristol-Myers' Excedrin
advertisement, representing that its product Excedrin is and has been shown to be a
more effective pain relieving agent than common aspirin, constituted a deceptive trade
practice within the meaning of sections 5 and 12 of the Act. Id. at 987-88.
I" Id. at 1002; accord, Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973). The
Holloway court gave only slight attention to the federalism issue, noting simply that
"Congress has superimposed a structure of Federal law upon the existing system of
common law remedies for fraud and deceit without preempting or superseding the
latter." 485 F.2d at 989. Holloway has been criticized for underemphasizing the factor
of especial benefit, which arguably is found in the strong policy of the Wheeler-Lea
Amendments to protect consumers from unfair or deceptive commercial practices. See,
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court's finding of legislative intent to exclude private enforce-
ment, based in part upon statutory construction and in part
upon a reading of the legislative histories of the original Act of
1914 and the Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938, is open to
criticism. 1 2 The court reasoned as follows: The Supreme Court,
in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,' 13 denied a private remedy
under section 5 as worded prior to the 1938 Wheeler-Lea
Amendments. The 1938 amendments, recognizing the need to
protect consumers as well as injured competitors, endowed the
FTC with new and more potent enforcement tools but did not
explicitly overrule Moore by providing the additional enforce-
ment mechanism of a private right of action. Thus, the Holloway
court inferred that Congress intended agency enforcement to be
exclusive.
114
Several observations should be made concerning this infer-
ence of legislative intent. First, the precise nature of the holding
in Moore is a subject of much debate;1 15 a more limited reading
of the case would place primary, but not exclusive, jurisdiction in
the FTC.1 16 Second, even granting the Holloway court's reading
of Moore, making legislative silence-here Congress' failure to
explicitly overrule the Moore interpretation-dispositive of legis-
lative intent is a fallacious method of statutory construction.
17
Third, the court's implicit assumption, founded upon the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"1 8 that establishment of an
elaborate scheme of agency enforcement indicates an intent to
preclude other means of enforcement, specifically private ac-
Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different View of Private Enforcement Under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 274, 285-91 (1975); Note, supra note 49,
at 780; Note, Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 11 HOUSTON
L. REV. 699, 705 (1974). See also Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 588 (N.D.
Ind. 1976).
"2 See, e.g., Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 588 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Note,
supra note 49, at 780-85; Note, Divesting the FTC of Exclusive Enforcement of the Federal
Trade Commission Act: Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 38 U. PiTT. L. REV. 113
(1976). See generally Implications, supra note 104, at 1411-26.
,13 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
114 485 F.2d at 990-97.
115 See, e.g., Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 588 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Note,
supra note 49, at 782-83; Note, supra note 111, at 705. Because Moore predated the
Wheeler-Lea Amendments, its relevance to the issue of consumers' rights under the Act
is doubtful.
116 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926) ("This [action] is an attempt to allege unfair methods
of competition, which may be put aside at once, since relief in such cases . . . must be
afforded in the first instance by the [FTC]."); see Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp.
582, 588 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
117 See, e.g., Note, supra note 49, at 783-85; Implications, supra note 104, at 1411-26.
118 Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.
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tions, is belied by several Supreme Court decisions. 119 Fourth,
the legislative history cited in Holloway is at most inconclusive
regarding legislative intent either to create or to preclude a pri-
vate remedy. 211 Finally, the Cort decision arguably assigns legisla-
tive intent only a secondary role in the implication test' 2' and, if
this reading of Cort is correct, absent a clear indication of intent
to deny a private remedy there should be no presumption of the
exclusivity of a statute's explicit enforcement mechanism. 22 In
short, implication of a private remedy should not be made con-
tingent on an "extrapolation of legislative intent.' ' 123 Rather,
given the implication doctrine's underlying rationale, 24 it seems
far more appropriate that the determinative factors be the
necessity of a private remedy to protect the rights of those to be
"especially benefitted" by the statute and the absence of signifi-
cant conflict with other primary statutory policies.
119 E.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (implied private rem-
edy exists under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 despite the explicit remedy provided
therein of enforcement by the Attorney General via civil suits); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (private enforcement right implied under the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 notwithstanding the SEC enforcement machinery explicitly provided
therein). But see National R.R. Pass'rs Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass'rs, 414 U.S.
453, 458 (1974) (relying in part on the expressio unius maxim, the Court found no pri-
vate right of action for violations of Rail Passengers Service Act of 1970 except in the
limited circumstances specified in the Act); McMahon & Rodos, supra note 104, at
191-92:
Although it may be foolhardy to predict the result of future suits seeking im-
plication of private causes of action, the authors believe that . .. with the
Supreme Court as it exists today, if a statute provides for participation by an
administrative agency and such participation in any way would effectuate the
congressional purpose of the statute, the Court will not imply a private cause
of action.120 See sources cited at note 112 supra. There is legislative history that might be
construed as supporting the inference that Congress did intend to create a private right
of enforcement of the Act. See, Gard, supra note 111, at 288. But see Comment, Private
Enforcement and Rulemaking under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Expansion of FTC
Responsibiliy, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 462, 471-72 (1974) (Only the legislative history of the
1914 Act is discussed; the conclusion is reached that, overall, this history "proves
equivocal." Id. at 474. The author praises the Holloway decision).
221 Discussing National R.R. Pass'rs Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass'rs, 414 U.S.
543, the Court suggested that only when the legislative history provides specific support
for the proposition that remedies are to be exclusive and the provision under discussion
creates a private cause of action for some plaintiffs for some kinds of disputes is the
expressio unius maxim relevant. 422 U.S. at 82-83 n.14. Thus, it is reasonable to infer
that the legislative intent factor, as well as the expressio unius maxim, will be given a
lesser role in implication cases than the other factors that are part of the implication
analysis.
122See 422 U.S. at 82-83 & n.14. For a more detailed discussion of the Cort
legislative intent factor, see Emerging Standards, supra note 105, at 310-11.
123 422 U.S. at 83 n.14.
124 See text accompanying notes 105-06 supra.
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In light of the general rationale of the implication doctrine,
then, the second major ground for the Holloway holding-that a
private right of action would conflict significantly with the Act's
explicit enforcement scheme' 25 -is the more telling. The court
in Holloway argued that the Act's enforcement policy is predi-
cated upon the FTC's expertise both in giving specific content to
section 5's broad proscription of "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce" and in exercising discretion concerning
when and how to prosecute violators.1 26 According to this argu-
ment, piecemeal private actions before an assortment of courts
would jeopardize the development of coherent precedent con-
struing the Act. Further, because motivated by individual con-
cerns, such actions only rarely would coincide with the agency's
prosecutorial strategy. 127 However, even with private actions the
FTC's expertise could be tapped-either by its intervention in
those actions or, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,1
2 8
through referring to it for preliminary determination issues
within its special competence. 129 The Holloway court rejected
these alternatives, however, because they arguably involved a
reduction in the FTC's prosecutorial discretion. 3°1 The court
also rejected a final contention that since limited resources effec-
tively prevented the FTC from proceeding against all but a very
few violators, private actions, rather than interfering with the
agency's enforcement program, were a necessary supplement to
implementation of section 5's policy of consumer protection. 13'
125 485 F.2d at 997-1002.
126 FTC expertise is repeatedly evoked in the opinion. 485 F.2d at 990, 995-96,
997, 998-99. See Note, supra note 49, at 785-88; Comment, supra note 120, at 475 ("The
FTC, with its over-view of the national economy, is in a better position than a private
litigant to gauge the injury a deceptive practice will cause to the public and to balance
this against the likely cost of eliminating the practice."). But see Guernsey v. Rich Plan,
408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976):
To conclude that without exception, the Federal Trade Commission ... is in a
better position than a private litigant to gauge the injury a deceptive practice
will cause to the public . . . ignore[s] the basic premise of the free enterprise
economy-that consumers should have the opportunity to choose between
competing merchants on the basis of price, quality and service.
Id. at 588.
127 485 F.2d at 997-98.
1 See Note, supra note 49, at 786.
1 For example, whether a particular course of conduct constitutes a deceptive
trade practice within the meaning of § 5 might be referred to the FTC for preliminary
determination.
'3 485 F.2d at 999.
I' d. at 1000-02. The court stressed the impairment of FTC discretion that would
result if private actions were allowed. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), which
used a "necessary supplement" rationale to imply a private right of action under the
IMPLIED CONSUMER REMEDY
The argument in Holloway that a private remedy is inconsis-
tent with the legislative scheme is unpersuasive to the extent that
it gives lesser weight to the importance of section 5's policy of
protecting consumers than to the secondary policy of maintain-
ing the integrity of the Act's enforcement mechanism. 132 Al-
though both grounds of the decision, therefore, are vulnerable
to attack, this Comment adopts the position that Holloway is good
law when a private remedy is sought for an alleged violation of
the bare, uninterpreted terms of section 5. The case, however, is
not an apt precedent for resolving the issue whether a private
remedy should be implied to redress violations of section 5's
terms as authoritatively construed by the FTC either in an ad-
judicative proceeding or in a trade regulation rule such as the
preservation of defenses rule. 133 When the FTC has already de-
fined explicitly the range of acceptable trade practices in a par-
ticular area, the conflict between a private remedy and the
statutory scheme of enforcement is significantly reduced, if not
eliminated altogether. Coherence of precedent is assured, be-
cause the courts will grant relief only when the offending con-
duct already has been construed in the expert judgment of the
FTC to be in violation of section 5.134 Private actions still will
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, was distinguished on the ground that the jurisdic-
tional provision involved in Borak was general, whereas those provisions in the Federal
Trade Commission Act are specific. 485 F.2d at 1001. The court also emphasized that in
Borak, the SEC intervened as amicus, urging that private remedies be recognized. Id.
Gard points out, however, that the FTC also has advocated private enforcement of the
Act. Gard, supra note 111, at 280, 288-89.
132 See note 11l supra.
' This is the position taken in Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 587-89
(N.D. Ind. 1976); Note, supra note 49, at 789-90.
134 See, e.g., Note, supra note 49, at 789-90.
In the situation under discussion here, the courts will not need the FTC's expert
guidance to determine whether the rule has been violated. An alleged omission of the
required notice from a consumer note or incorporation of a waiver of defense clause
into an agreement of sale involves straightforward, nontechnical factual issues. In the
case of omission of the notice from a consumer loan agreement, however, whether
there has been a violation of the rule depends upon the factual determination of
whether the loan is a "purchase money loan," and this turns on whether the creditor
and seller are "affiliated ... by common control, contract, or business arrangement" or
whether a "referral" has taken place within the meaning of the rule. See notes 60, 68-73
supra & accompanying text. These can indeed be complex factual issues; concern in the
business community regarding the exact reach of part (b) of the rule led the FTC to
issue Enforcement Policy, supra note 11. See id. 34,595. Arguably, therefore, the interest
articulated in Holloway of ensuring coherence of precedent under the Act might justify
denying a private remedy in interlocking loan situations. The specter of each state
jurisdiction formulating a different standard of what constitutes a "purchase money
loan," or alternatively of the FTC having to intervene in numerous local contract dis-
putes to guarantee the application of a uniform standard, might move the courts to
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impinge on FTC's prosecutorial discretion, but the need for this
discretion relative to the need to protect individual consumers is
diminished when the agency already has determined that the
conduct violates the Act. 135 Furthermore, in these instances, the
FTC's failure to move against violators may well result from
resource limitations and not from exercise of discretion. 36 In
the absence of a significant conflict with the enforcement policy
of the Act, the dominant concern should be to effectuate the
Act's policy of affording consumers adequate protection from
deceptive trade practices.
Taking these considerations into account and distinguishing
Holloway on its facts, in Guernsey v. Rich Plan137 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana found an
implied private right of action in a case involving alleged con-
duct that, in an earlier proceeding before the FTC, 13 8 had been
ruled to be in violation of section 5.139 Justifying its holding, the
court noted:
[Assuming the allegations of the complaint to be
true] Rich Plan of the Midwest ... would fall within the
class defined in the consent decree [issued in 1963]. As
the activities of the companies involved in the consent
abstain from interfering in this area. The FTC, however, contemplates that different
state jurisdictions will construe "purchase money loan" for purposes of any private rem-
edies that may be created by state law: "This Statement is issued as guide for com-
pliance with the Rule. It is also intended as an aid to assure consistent application of the
Rule under those state laws which create additional private remedies for violation of its
requirements." Id. (emphasis supplied). Given the FTC's apparent view that state courts
can construe "purchase money loan" without doing violence to uniformity, therefore,
courts should not eschew implication of a federal remedy in interlocking loan situations
merely because of the difficult underlying factual determinations.
13' Note, supra note 49, at 788-89.
136 Id. at 792; see note 91 supra & accompanying text.
"137 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976), noted in 29 VAND. L. REV. 1077 (1976).
138 The prior proceeding was nonadjudicative in nature; that is, it did not involve a
formal hearing before an administrative law judge. Although the consent decree that
issued therefrom did not, therefore, formally establish that defendant's conduct violated
§ 5, it is conclusive of the FTC's opinion in this regard. The argument that a private ac-
tion premised on a prior FTC proceeding does not conflict with the agency's own en-
forcement of the Act would seem to be unaffected by whether the prior proceeding
was formally adjudicative. But see 29 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1085 (1976) ("[P]rivate en-
forcement may well cause a loss of whatever effectiveness the Commission now can
claim in securing compliance with the Act through nonadjudicative proceedings be-
cause ... entering into a consent agreement with the FTC would seem tantamount to
inviting a lawsuit." (footnote omitted)).
13' Although merely distinguishing Holloway, the Guernsey court questioned both
grounds of the Holloway decision along the lines suggested in text accompanying notes
112-31 supra. 408 F. Supp. at 586-88. Thus, even though the precise holding in Guern-
sey only distinguishes Holloway, its dicta suggest that Holloway be rejected altogether.
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decree above are nearly identical to the alleged activities
of the defendant Rich Plan of the Midwest, it may be
inferred that the Federal Trade Commission would
have the same view of the practices in this case as it had
of the practices that it ruled on in the 1963 cease and
desist order. If that is the case, then, since the Federal
Trade Commission has examined the complained of
practices and found them wanting, one of the hurdles
to the private enforcement of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act has been cleared ....
It concluded: "The Federal Trade Commission Act has been the
subject of 60 years of interpretation through adjudication and
over ten years of rulemaking .... Both businessmen and courts
should have no trouble determining the precise stricture of the
act.141
Directly in conflict with Guernsey is Bott v. Holiday Universal,
Inc. ,142 a recent decision of the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. In Bott, defendants' alleged violation of
an FTC consent order was held to be an insufficient basis to
distinguish Holloway. The court followed Holloway in dismissing
the complaint "not only because it is the law of this Circuit, but
also because it is the correct decision.' 43 To support its assertion
that Holloway was correctly decided, the court merely quoted the
passage from Holloway stating that a private right of action
necessarily would conflict with the Act's policy of placing the
enforcement decision within "the FTC's sound discretion and
expert judgment. ' 144 The court did not explain why the policy
favoring enforcement discretion should outweigh the substan-
tive policy to be enforced-protection of consumers-when the
agency has identified specifically the prohibited conduct. 45
140 408 F. Supp. at 587-88.
141 Id. at 588 (citation omitted).
142 Civ. No. 75-1982 (D.D.C. July 14, 1976).
1
43 Id. at 3.
144 Id. (quoting Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997-98 (D.C. Cir.
1973)).
142 At least one commentator shares the view of the Bott court:
Limiting the implied private right of action to cases in which the FTC has
ruled on the practices involved ... recognized that the FTC's expert judgment
and inherent agency discretion in defining "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices" are central to the statutory framework .... [T]he Commission's expertise
and discretion are no less applicable to the exercise of its enforcement powers:
the statutory scheme clearly comprehends that administrative flexibility will be
brought to bear both in defining violations and in dealing with violators. With
the FTC's flexibility in the latter regard, equally central to the FTCA, even
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Guernsey was summarily disposed of as "contrary to the legislative
history and intent of the FTC Act and subsequent amendments,
as examined in the Holloway decision."'
46
The Bott court ignored the possibility that Holloway's argu-
ment against private enforcement, based on legislative history
and inferred congressional intent, may have been weakened sub-
stantially by Cort.147 It also failed to recognize that the policy
justifications for denying a private remedy in Holloway should
not necessarily bar such a remedy on the very different facts of
Bott or Guernsey.' 48 When private rights of action are sought,
courts should distinguish cases in which the bare terms of section
5 are at issue from those in which previously articulated stan-
dards of the FTC form the basis of the complaint. In the latter
situations, courts should find implied private rights of action so
long as such remedies would conform to the Cort criteria. This
Comment will show that an implied private remedy under the
FTC rule preserving claims and defenses does conform to those
criteria.' 49 Given the peculiar procedural posture in which con-
sumers are likely to find themselves when they wish to call on the
aid of the rule, reliance on agency enforcement will be a wholly
inadequate remedy; implication of a private remedy, therefore,
is appropriate to assure vindication of section 5 policy as em-
bodied in the rule.
C. Implied Private Remedy Under the FTC Rule
1. Unique Procedural Posture
Returning once again to the introductory scenario, if the
FTC rule were in force at the time of the transaction between
Seller and Consumer, when the credit contract was signed, Con-
sumer may have been unaware that it omitted a notice required
by federal law. When Financer, seeking unpaid installments,
claims the holder-in-due-course privilege against Consumer in
limited private enforcement is inconsistent.
29 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1085 (1976).
146 Civ. No. 75-1982, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. July 14, 1976).
147 See notes 121-23 supra & accompanying text.
148 In order to effectuate a primary statutory policy, the Supreme Court has im-
plied a private cause of action under a statute that it had previously construed to ex-
clude such a remedy when presented with a new fact situation in which the conflict that
dictated the earlier holding no longer obtained. Compare Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern
Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962), with T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464
(1959). For further discussion of these two cases, see, e.g., Implications, supra note 104, at
1427-28.
149 Text accompanying notes 159-213 infra.
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state court, however, Consumer's counsel should be cognizant
of the rule as a potential source of a federal right to assert
Consumer's defense, be it nondelivery, breach of warranty, or
other personal defense. 50 Applying the doctrine of implication
in this procedural posture presents two unique aspects: (1) the
federal issue is raised in the context of a state adjudication, and
(2) the implied private right of enforcement claimed is not the
right to bring suit for reformation of the contract, but rather the
right to raise underlying defenses that the omitted clause would
have preserved for Consumer. A more characteristic posture for
applying the implication doctrine-a suit for affirmative relief in
federal court-would result if Consumer sued Seller in federal
district court for reformation of the credit contract to include
the notice required by the FTC rule. Whether, as a practical
matter, such a suit would ever be brought is contingent upon
Consumer's learning, soon after signing the negotiable note over
to Seller, of the FTC rule and its significance.' 5 1
The two distinctive elements enumerated above should not
constitute a basis for declining to apply the implication doctrine.
State courts are bound by the Supremacy Clause'52 to adjudicate
the merits of federal questions in cases otherwise within their
jurisdiction. 5 3 Further, assertion of an implied private federal
right defensively rather than offensively should not affect rec-
ognition of the underlying substantive right. An implied federal
right to assert defenses against Financer by its very nature often
will be asserted in a defensive posture; 54 Consumer, refusing a
claim for payment, can only assert his implied right defen-
sively.155 Moreover, Consumer's defensive assertion of his im-
Is0 When an earlier version of the rule was under consideration by the FTC in
1971-73, the issue of the rule as a potential source of federal rights was discussed in
legal commentary. See Comment, supra note 49, at 184-86; Note, The FTC Proposed Rule
and the Holder in Due Course, 18 S.D. L. REV. 516 (1973).
151 A third posture could arise as follows: After Consumer has made a downpay-
ment to Seller and installment payments to Financer, Seller breaches the sales agree-
ment. Consumer then might sue either Seller or Financer in federal court to recoup the
sums paid, grounding the action in the FTC rule. For a discussion of implied consumer
rights as against the financer, see text accompanying notes 186-200 infra. This Com-
ment will not explore the ramifications of affirmative use of the rule by consumers
because, realistically, consumers most often will be caught in the defensive posture; it is
in such a posture that the consumer's need for a private remedy is greatest. See text
accompanying notes 85-93 supra.
152 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
15' Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
154 A consumer may wish to assert his defense on an underlying sales contract for
goods offensively against a financer seeking to repossess the goods. See note 2, supra.
155 Of course, if the implied right to preserve claims against the holder of a credit
contract permits a consumer to sue affirmatively on those claims against such a holder,
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plied right is only a matter of form, not of substance; a success-
ful action for reformation of the contract to include the clause
preserving his claims and defenses automatically would permit
Consumer to assert those claims and defenses in state court.'
5 6
The question whether the rule yields an implied private right of
enforcement 57 to Consumer, therefore, turns not on the pro-
cedural issue, but on the conformity of such an implied right to
the Cort criteria.
58
2. Application of the Cort Test
a. Especial Benefit
As mentioned earlier, the Holloway decision underplayed the
strong policy of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments in favor of pro-
tecting consumers from deceptive trade practices. 59 It might be
argued that although the Wheeler-Lea Amendments evidenced a
general policy favoring consumers, the scheme of the Act en-
trusted the FTC with the responsibility of singling out the classes
of consumers to be especially benefited. In other words, as the
Holloway opinion repeatedly stressed, the Act assigns to the reg-
ulatory agency and not to the courts the function of particulariz-
ing the Act's general mandate. 60 This objection is totally inap-
posite to the case now under consideration; in promulgating its
rule, the FTC clearly singled out a situation such as that of the
introductory scenario as meriting special concern and as one of
the very problems to be remedied:
In announcing this rule, we are pursuing our
statutory mandate to identify and prevent unfair or de-
that opportunity for an affirmative suit should not bar the consumer from counter-
claiming for past payments if it is the holder who brings suit.
156 The FTC is not limited to seeking mere reformation of consumer credit con-
tracts, but may also seek damages on behalf of consumers suffering injury resulting
from failure to include the required notice, see note 56 supra & accompanying text
-injury that would arise only if the consumer has an underlying defense or claim. An
implied private consumer action against a financer for damages resulting from the
omission of the clause would parallel the FTC's right of action against the seller to seek
the same damages on the consumer's behalf.
"' Private rights of action may be implied under regulations of federal agencies.
See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (finding a private cause of action
under Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975) promulgated pursuant to § 14(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (finding a private cause of action under
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970)).
1'8 See text accompanying note 109 supra.
159 See notes 46-49, 111-24 supra & accompanying text.
16' See note 126 supra.
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ceptive practices in the marketplace. . . .We conclude
that a consumer's duty to pay for goods or services must
not be separated from a seller's duty to perform as
promised, regardless of the manner in which payment
is made. In reaching this conclusion we note thousands
of instances, documented in the record of this proceed-
ing, where the separation of what are normally re-
garded as reciprocal duties caused substantial injury to
consumers. The common sense shock articulated by
many of the consumer witnesses upon learning that
their duty to repay a creditor was totally unrelated to
their seller's promises is perhaps the clearest and most
direct evidence of the injurious and distorted impact of
the challenged practices.
16 1
b. Intent to Deny a Private Remedy
Regarding the legislative intent prong of the Cort test, the
Supreme Court noted: "[I]n situations in which it is clear that
federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not
necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action,
although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would
be controlling.'16 2 Because the rule's specific purpose is to pre-
serve consumers' rights to raise claims and defenses, it is not
necessary to demonstrate an intention to create a private remedy
but only to show a lack of explicit intent to deny one.
The current rule and its proposed revision are silent on
the issue of consumers' remedies when the required notice is
omitted from the credit contract.' 63 Following the Holloway
court, financers could argue that, applying the maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, the inference must be drawn that the
FTC was granted an exclusive right to enforce the Act and all
pursuant agency regulations. The Act's failure to create ex-
pressly a private right of enforcement, however, hardly dem-
onstrates that Congress intended the FTC's enforcement of
such regulations to be exclusive. 6 4 Because consumer redress
action brought by the FTC would be an inadequate, after-the-
fact remedy, 65 it would be improper to infer congressional in-
161 FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,523 (footnote omitted).
162 422 U.S. at 82 (emphasis in original).
163 See note 99 supra & accompanying text.
164 Defendants in Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976), un-
successfully made this argument in the interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
Brief for Appellant at 12-15.
1'5 See Gard, supra note 111, at 290-91 n.87; note 38 supra & accompanying text.
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tent to preclude a private consumer remedy from the grant of
authority to the FTC to engage in consumer redress litigation.
When Congress has not explicitly restricted the scope of avail-
able remedies, courts should not attribute to it an intent to limit
that scope such that only inadequate remedies are available. The
Supreme Court has sharply criticized and implicitly rejected such
an application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.166 Further-
more, although during the period 1969 to 1971 several bills that
explicitly provided for private enforcement of the Act either
died in committee or were never brought to a floor vote before
adjournment, 167 the failure of these bills to become law then
sheds no light on congressional intent regarding private rem-
edies four to six years later.' 68 Whatever congressional silence
may be, it is not intent to deny a private remedy sufficiently
explicit to circumvent the intent prong of Cort's implication
test.
1 69
c. Consistency with the Legislative Scheme
In Holloway, the fatal argument to implication of a private
right of enforcement was the one suggesting that interference
with the FTC's prosecutorial discretion would unnecessarily con-
flict with the general enforcement scheme of the Act.' 70 The
preservation of defenses rule, constituting the concrete expres-
sion of the FTC's expert opinion concerning the balance of
equities to be struck in applying section 5's broad proscription to
the facts of the introductory scenario, distinguishes cases gov-
erned by the FTC rule from Holloway; the importance of pro-
secutorial discretion is diminished once the agency has par-
ticularized its general mandate by specifying certain conduct as
violative of the statute.' 7' Concededly, affording a private con-
66 See cases cited at note 119 supra.
167 See note 57 supra.
168 At the same time that Congress strengthened the FTC's remedial tools, it passed
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1975), as Title I of
the 1975 Act.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act established minimum disclosure standards for
written warranties in consumer sales. Id. § 2304. Congress provided injured consumers
with a private cause of action for violations of the warranty provisions contained in
Tide I. Id. § 2310(d). That Congress did not provide a private cause of action for
violations of FTC trade regulations-the authority for which was provided in Tide II of
the 1975 Act, see note 53 supra-is not, however, grounds for inferring a congressional
intent to deny a private cause of action under the latter Tide. See, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 82 n.14 (1975); Emerging Standards, supra note 104, at 311.
169 See text accompanying note 162 supra.
170 See 485 F.2d at 997-1002; text accompanying notes 125-26 supra.
"I See notes 132-36 supra and accompanying text.
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sumer remedy does invade the FTC's prosecutorial discretion to
the extent that a private suit or assertion of defenses pre-empts
the agency's determination of whether to bring a consumer re-
dress action at a later date on the same consumers' behalf. Yet
one might question the legitimacy of preserving that discretion
when the cost is cutting consumers off from their defenses and
forcing them to shoulder the immediate burden of payment-a
result in direct conflict with the policy articulated by the FTC in
its rule.
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak172 is instructive in this regard. The
plaintiff in that case claimed an implied private right to enforce
rule 14a-9173 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
promulgated under section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934,'1 4 which prohibits the use of false or misleading
proxy statements. In holding that a private right of enforcement
existed, the Supreme Court found such a private right compati-
ble with the statutory scheme of agency enforcement and noted
that "[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a neces-
sary supplement to Commission action."' 7 5 The Court further
commented that the SEC had insufficient resources to enforce
thoroughly the proxy rules176 -a situation likely to confront the
FTC in its efforts to enforce its trade regulation rules.17 7 A pri-
vate right of enforcement, therefore, does not conflict materially
with the Act's explicit scheme of agency enforcement and fairly
may be said to enhance enforcement of the rule.
It remains to be established that implication of a private
consumer remedy, notwithstanding the omission from the credit
contract of the notice to holders prescribed by the rule, does not
significantly conflict with primary policies of the agency regula-
tion. Two policies of the rule with which an implied private right
of enforcement could conflict might be alleged: a policy condi-
tioning consumers' right to raise their defenses on inclusion of
the notice to holders in the credit contract and a policy making
the rule enforceable only against sellers. The status of these
policies as true objectives of the rule, however, is highly ques-
tionable.
Regarding the first policy, whether the rule can be said to
172 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
173 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976).
174 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
175 377 U.S. at 432.
176 Id.
177 See note 91 supra & accompanying text.
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condition consumers' right to raise defenses on the inclusion of
the notice to holders in the credit instrument hinges on what is
taken to be the purpose of that notice. The purpose could be: (1)
to give actual notice to third-party financers so that they will not
be deprived "innocently" of their holder-in-due-course status, (2)
to impose an external form on the consumer credit instrument
such that state courts will declare it to be nonnegotiable, or (3) to
give consumers notice of their right to raise claims and defenses
against third-party financers who purport to be holders in due
course. If the required notice is designed to provide actual notice
to third-party financers, then omission of the notice, it might be
argued, should allow the financer to assert holder-in-due-course
status. One rationale for shifting the risk of seller misconduct
from the consumer maker of the instrument to the third-party
financer is the latter's superior ability to prevent and police
such misconduct. 178 This rationale is based on the assumption
that the financer has "notice" of his obligation to police the seller.
Even if lack of actual notice precludes the financer from polic-
ing the seller's conduct before the fact, however, the financer still
has access to such weapons as "repurchase" provisions that may
be utilized against the seller after the fact. In any event, the credi-
tor always has the ability, which consumers lack, to spread the
risk of loss. Thus, even were the purpose of the notice to holders
to provide actual notice to financers, the balance should still be
struck in favor of not conditioning consumers' rights to raise
defenses on inclusion of the notice. 179 In promulgating the rule,
however, the FTC gave no indication that the requirement of
incorporating the notice to holders in the credit instrument had
any purpose beyond foreclosing courts from construing the in-
strument to be negotiable. 1811 Importantly, the notice to holders
required by the FTC really does not give the kind of actual
notice that traditionally defeats holder-in-due-course status at
state law-actual notice of a particular claim or defense. l8 '
Rather it gives notice that financers closely dealing on a continu-
ing basis with sellers in consumer credit transactions no longer
will be accorded protected status. Notice of this character need
only be given once-financers hardly can argue that they need a
separate reminder of this basic shifting of risk in each new con-
178 See notes 79-81 supra & accompanying text.
179 Examples of state statutes providing that consumer defenses are to be preserved
even against a holder in due course are cited at note 99 supra.
180 See FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,522-25.
181 See note 18 supra & accompanying text.
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sumer contract.182 Sufficient notice of the altered balance of
power in consumer credit-sale transactions is afforded by the
FTC rule itself. Although inclusion of the notice is, therefore,
unnecessary for the purpose of alerting creditors who may be
charged with constructive notice of the rule, inclusion may serve
the purpose of informing consumers of their right to raise claims
and defenses. 183 Admittedly, many consumers may be ignorant
of the legal significance of the notice, but for those who under-
stand it, the notice may provide a valuable warning that they
need not forego their defenses upon demand of payment from a
third-party financer. Of course, if inclusion of the notice has as
its purpose informing consumers of their rights, then omission
should not be an excuse for divesting them of these rights
should they learn about them from some other quarter, such as
counsel.
The second inquiry is whether the rule evidences a policy
that it be enforced only against sellers; if it does, an implied
consumer right to raise defenses against financers should be de-
nied. Under the proposed amendment to the current rule, this is
a moot issue-both sellers and financers would be subject to its
sanction. 184 Even under the current rule, however, assertion of
an implied right against financers, far from being contrary to the
policy of the rule, would further its policy of preventing the
separation of a consumer's duty to pay for goods from the
seller's duty to fulfill contractual obligations.
8 5
Harmony of an implied private right of action with the Act's
enforcement scheme and the rule's policy, however, does not
settle the issue. There remains the further question whether
courts will extend the implication doctrine to encompass a third
party. Generally, an implied right of action is asserted by a pri-
vate litigant against a party who is the object of the statutory,
regulatory, or constitutional duty. 8 6 When violation of that duty
causes injury to a person with an implied right of action, the
182 The realities of these transactions are such that financers always will know they
are dealing with consumer contracts. When a consumer completes a negotiable note in
conjunction with an installment sale, the note is usually attached by perforation to the
agreement of sale. When the note is assigned by the seller the agreement of sale is
transferred along with it to the financer-assignee. Furthermore, assignments generally
are not made on an individual basis-a financer usually will purchase at discount large
amounts of consumer paper issued by a particular seller. In the case of an interlocking
loan, the financer will have to call the seller to arrange security.
183 See FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,526.
184 See notes 94-95 supra & accompanying text.
185 See notes 198-200 infra & accompanying text.
186 See cases and sources cited at 104 supra.
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private litigant may seek redress against the violator. Thus, the
Supreme Court held in Borak that stockholders have an implied
right to sue a corporate director for violation of the SEC's proxy
rules. 187 Unlike the traditional implied federal right of action
configuration, however, in the consumer's situation, although
the duty imposed by the rule is violated by the seller, the con-
sumer's injury-loss of defenses and claims against the hold-
er of his credit contract-is caused by a third party outside the
scope of the rule: the financer. The consumer's posture is
further distinguished from that of the traditional private litigant
when, as often will be the case, the consumer is in a defensive
position.' 88 If consumers are denied an implied right of action
against financers, they first must bear the loss resulting from the
sellers' breach of duty and then seek damages from the sellers,
paralleling the current process by which a consumer's claims and
defenses are vindicated by the FTC. 189 Assertion of an implied
right of action--offensively or defensively-should be permitted
against a third party who causes the actual injury as a result of
the breach of duty that the regulation imposes on another. 90 A
consumer credit transaction such as the one set forth in the
introductory scenario requires according the consumer an im-
plied right to raise defenses against the financer that otherwise
could be raised against the seller; if assertion of an implied right
against such a third party is denied, any implied right of en-
forcement would be rendered largely ineffective and implemen-
tation of the policies underlying the rule would be inhibited.' 91
Although the implication doctrine generally has not been
187 377 U.S. 426, 431-33 (1964); see text accompanying notes 172-76 supra.
'88 See text accompanying notes 85-93, 150-51 supra. A consumer will not always be
in a defensive posture; he may seek to sue either his seller or his financer for reforma-
tion of the contract or for damages. See note 151 supra & accompanying text.
189 See text accompanying note 93 supra. As a further complication, the seller may
be judgment proof. See note 4 supra.
190 Cf. Deckert v. Independence Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (when circumstances
make recovery from a fraudulent seller of securities unusually difficult, a statutorily
granted private cause of action against such sellers implies a right to seek equitable
relief against a third-party insurance company that, in its capacity as administrator of a
trust of common stocks, receives installment payments for shares and collects dividends
and profits). In extending the statutorily created right of action to the third party, the
Court noted that insofar as the courts have the power to enforce legal obligations
[t]he power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of recovery
[that the obligation imposes]. And the power to make the right of recovery
effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions normally
available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case.
Id. at 288 (emphasis in original).
191 See notes 198-200 infra & accompanying text.
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extended to encompass such third parties, the basic principles
underlying the implication cases do not conflict with such an
extension. In Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby,' 9 2 stating that an
appropriate plaintiff193 may assert an implied right of action
against a party defaulting on his statutory duty, 194 the Court
added, "'So, in every case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits a
thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon
the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for
the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said
law.' "195 Similarly, in Borak the Court noted:
It is for the federal courts "to adjust their remedies, so
as to grant the necessary relief" where federally secured
rights are invaded. "And it is well settled that where
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make
good the wrong done."'
96
The Borak Court also pointed out:
"When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful,
the extent and nature of the legal consequences of the
condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial
determination, are nevertheless federal questions, the
answers to which are to be derived from the statute and
the federal policy which it has adopted."' 97
Insofar as the federal policy underlying the FTC rule is
preventing the separation of a consumer's duty topay from the
seller's duty to fulfill contractual obligations, 98 the policy can be
effectuated fully only by permitting an implied right of action
against the financer; by proposing its revised rule, 99 the FTC
acknowledged that full policy implementation requires bringing
the financer within the scope of remedial action. Heeding the
192 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
193 One "for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted .... Id. at 39.
194 Id.
19 51 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Anonymous, 87 Eng. Rep. 791 (Q.B. 1706).
196 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
197 377 U.S. at 433 (quoting Sole Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176
(1942)). A state court may resolve the question of an implied federal right of action and
permit the consumer to assert his defenses and claims against a third party. See text
accompanying note 153 supra.
199 Text accompanying note 61 supra.
199 See notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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Borak Court's admonition that "it is the duty of the courts to be
alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective
the congressional purpose, ' 200 courts should permit assertion of
claims and defenses against the financer, notwithstanding that
the breach of duty under the current rule is by the seller. In no
other way can the courts "make good the wrong done"2° ' to the
consumer by violation of the FTC rule.
d. Federalism Concerns
Cort cited with approval20 2 the implication of a federal pri-
vate right of action to enforce the SEC's proxy rules inJ.I. Case
Co. v. Borak.20 3 The Cort opinion recognized that it was entirely
appropriate to afford the Borak plaintiff a federal remedy: "In
Borak, the statute involved was clearly an intrusion of federal law
into the internal affairs of corporations; to the extent that state
law differed or impeded suit, the congressional intent could be
compromised in state-created causes of action. ' 20 4 By contrast,
the plaintiff in Cort claimed an implied right to enforce the fed-
eral criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making "a
contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at
which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors . . . are to be
voted for.' '215 Plaintiff owned stock in a corporation that al-
legedly had made expenditures in connection with the 1972
presidential election. 00 The Court noted that the purpose of the
criminal statute was to eliminate undue corporate financial in-
fluence in elections and that protection of stockholders was,
at best, a secondary concern. 20 7 The Court held that it was ap-
propriate, given the subsidiary nature of this policy to protect
shareholders, to relegate plaintiff to state law remedies-ultra
vires actions and actions for breach of fiduciary duty.
2 0 8
Application of the federalism prong of the implication test
involves, in effect, a determination of whether the consumer's
case is more appropriately analogized to Borak or Cort. The FTC
rule clearly is an intrusion of federal law into an area typically
2oo 377 U.S. at 433.
201 J.1. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684
(1946)); see text accompanying note 196 supra.
202 422 U.S. at 85.
203 377 U.S. 426 (1964); see text accompanying notes 172-76 supra.
204 422 U.S. at 85.
205 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
206 422 U.S. at 71.
207 Id. at 80-82.
20 8 Id. at 84.
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regulated by state law; it is not less so merely because the rule is
implemented through the mechanism of state law when the re-
quired notice is included in a consumer credit contract.20 9 In-
deed, in promulgating its rule, the FTC intended to superimpose
a uniform federal policy of preserving consumer defenses on the
existing patchwork of state regulation of negotiability in con-
sumer credit sales. 210 The Borak Court noted that if state law
"happened to attach no responsibility to the use of misleading
proxy statements, the whole purpose of the section [of the Se-
curities and Exchange Act] might be frustrated. ' 211 Similarly, if
state law did not permit assertion of claims and defenses against
a financer, the purpose of the FTC rule-protection of con-
sumers212-would be frustrated. The need for uniform, nation-
wide enforcement of a federal policy is strong justification for
implying a federal remedy. 213 Thus, Borak, not Cort, is the gov-
erning precedent on the federalism issue in the consumer situa-
tion and suggests that consumers should be accorded an im-
plied federal right to assert claims and defenses-offensively or
defensively-against third-party financers.
V. IMPACT OF THE FTC RULE ON
STATE LAW REMEDIES
A consumer who does not prevail on the issue of an implied
federal right to raise claims and defenses still may argue for a
remedy at state law. Of course, in jurisdictions that have ban-
209 Text accompanying note 64 supra.
21
1 See FTC Statement, supra note 11, at 53,521. For a discussion of state regulation,
see notes 28-44 supra & accompanying text.
211 377 U.S. at 434-35.
212 Note 161 supra & accompanying text. Implication of a private remedy under the
rule raises the issue of the FTC's power to preempt state law via its rulemaking power.
Technically the preemption issue is not raised by the explicit operation of the rule.
Even though inclusion of the notice to holders is a requirement of federal law, this
requirement of itself does not displace state law-no state forbids the inclusion of a
notice in credit instruments that renders them nonnegotiable. Once the notice is in-
cluded, preservation of defenses results purely as a matter of state law. Note 64 supra &
accompanying text. If, however, when the notice to holders is omitted from the credit
contract the FTC rule nonetheless impliedly permits preservation of claims and de-
fenses, then the state law that otherwise would extend protected status to the holder is
preempted. Although the FTC lacks the power to preempt effective state consumer
protection regulation by its rulemaking, FTC preemption of ineffective state regulation
by the rulemaking process is permissible. See H.R. REP. No. 1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
45 (1974). State regulation of defense cut-off devices is plainly ineffective. See notes
28-44 supra & accompanying text. For a fuller discussion of the preemption issue, see
Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DUKE L.J. 225.
213 Emerging Standards, supra note 104, at 316; Implications, supra note 104, at 1436.
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ished negotiability from consumer credit sales, a consumer's
right to raise claims and defenses is well established as a matter
of state law. 214 In other jurisdictions, depending upon whether
the cut-off mechanism employed is a negotiable instrument or a
waiver of defense clause, the right may also be explicit at state
law. 215 If, however, the consumer is the victim of an interlocking
loan cut-off, then there is less likelihood of an explicit state law
remedy.216 Where neither statute nor judicial precedent creates
an adequate basis for remedy, one might argue that even when
the notice to holders is not incorporated into a credit contract,
financers should be charged with constructive notice of con-
sumer claims and defenses by virtue of the rule and so denied
holder-in-due-course status.2 17 Alternatively, it could be argued
that notice of the rule strips financers of the good faith .requisite
to holder-in-due-course status under state law.
218
Most courts, however, still adhere to a subjective test of good
faith. 21 9 To withhold protected status, one ordinarily must show
actual knowledge, or reason to know, of a particular defense,
not merely knowledge that some defense potentially may be
raised. 220 Furthermore, a holder has no duty of inquiry.221 The
"close connectedness" doctrine represents a step in the direction
of an objective standard of good faith, but it has been construed
narrowly.222
Clearly, what a financer has notice of by virtue of the rule is
not a consumer's particular defense but the federal policy judg-
ment that, because financers are better able to avoid or spread
the costs of sellers' misconduct, a consumer's right to raise a
defense should be preserved. 223 Such notice, therefore, may be
held not to block holder-in-due-course status. Nor would a state
court necessarily construe notice of the rule to render a financer
lacking in the good faith requisite to holder-in-due-course status,
even though the financer knowingly is contravening a federal
policy by cutting the consumer off from claims and defenses.
The state court very well may perceive state policy to strike a
2 14 See notes 39-43 supra & accompanying text.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 See Comment, supra note 49, at 183-84; text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
218 See Comment, supra note 49, at 183-84.
219 Littlefield, supra note 6.
221 See id. at 65; Comment, supra note 49, at 183.
221 Comment, supra note 49, at 183.
222 See notes 30-38 supra & accompanying text.
223 See notes 179-82 supra & accompanying text.
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different balance regarding the allocation of risk among con-
sumers, sellers, and creditors. Denial of an implied federal rem-
edy would constitute, in effect, a determination that federal pol-
icy does not override conflicting state policy for purposes of the
financer's suit. For example, most state courts and legislatures
have not found a referral relationship between a seller and a
financer to be a sufficiently close connection to warrant denying
a financer-assignee of a consumer note, much less a financer-
issuer of an interlocking loan, protected status.224 The state
policy judgment may be that the financer, notwithstanding the
referral relationship with the seller, is too "innocent" to be sub-
jected to consumer defenses and that the availability of credit
would be affected too adversely, to the detriment of consumers
as a whole, by shifting the risk of a seller's misconduct onto the
financer under these circumstances. Assuming, then, that a state
court were not compelled to adopt the federal policy stance ex-
pressed in the FTC rule and to imply a right to raise defenses as
a matter of federal law, it might not adopt voluntarily the federal
standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
In promulgating its rule, the FTC interpreted the Act's
broad policy in favor of consumer protection to specifically sub-
sume a policy of preserving consumer claims and defenses. Exist-
ing state law is inadequate to accomplish this purpose when the
required notice to holders is omitted from the consumer credit
contract; there is no uniformity among jurisdictions in regula-
tion of negotiability in consumer transactions. If state law gov-
erns when the required notice has been omitted, therefore, the
rule's clear standard will be sacrificed to the caprice of geo-
graphical location. Furthermore, in those jurisdictions that do
regulate cut-off practices, consistent limitations generally are not
placed on all three of the cut-off mechanisms. The most dra-
matic loophole in almost all jurisdictions is the failure to police
interlocking loan transactions. Although state courts may adopt
voluntarily the standard of the rule as a matter of state law,
considerations of state policy well may foreclose such a result.
The policy of preserving consumer defenses cannot be en-
forced adequately by sole reliance on the mechanism explicitly
provided by the Act-cease and desist proceedings and civil ac-
tions for consumer redress brought by the FTC. When a third-
224 See note 38 supra & accompanying text.
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party financer demands payment from a consumer on a credit
contract omitting the required notice to holders, the only rem-
edy even potentially available is the FTC's civil action against
the seller. Unless the seller is a large offender, however, such
action is unlikely to be brought; even when it is, it takes place
only after the consumer has made the demanded payments to
the financer. A consumer might take independent action against
the seller for breach of the underlying sales contract if sufficient
resources were available-an unlikely possibility in the case of a
poor consumer-but in the paradigm situation involving a small,
judgment-proof seller, an action brought by the consumer, as by
the FTC, would be fruitless. If the proposed revision is put into
effect, the FTC would have the alternative of bringing redress
action against the financer, but once again the likelihood of the
agency exercising this option is small. In all cases the relief
would come only after the consumer has paid the financer in the
first instance-by no means an insignificant burden.
The preferred course should be for the courts to imply a
private federal right under the rule, permitting the consumer to
raise claims and defenses against the financer notwithstanding
omission of the notice. Objections leveled against implication of a
private right of enforcement do not apply in these circum-
stances. The expert opinion of the FTC on the subject of de-
fense cut-off practices in consumer credit-sale transactions has
been given concrete expression in the rule. Persisting interest in
retaining sole prosecutorial discretion in the enforcing agency is
far outweighed by the very policy to be enforced. That policy
risks substantial frustration if an implied federal right of en-
forcement is denied. Indeed, private enforcement and public
enforcement by the FTC complement one another. The private
remedy serves the immediate interest of the consumer in avoid-
ing the burden of having to pay a third-party financer for a per-
formance never received from a seller. Many consumers, how-
ever, will not learn of their rights under the rule and will incur
the hardship of payment. When these persons are the common
victims of a few offending sellers, redress actions brought by
the FTC will provide needed relief efficiently. More impor-
tantly, coupling civil actions for reformation of contracts with
consumer education campaigns instituted by the FTC will help
prevent defense cut-off problems from arising at all. After years
of ineffective state regulation, private and public enforcement
of the rule may be the final blow to the holder-in-due-course
doctrine in the credit-sale arena.
